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EXPERT HANDWRITING TESTIMONY: IS THE
WRITING REALLY ON THE WALL?
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 1936, the state of New Jersey executed Bruno Richard
Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr.,
son of aviator Charles Lindbergh.' Fours year prior to his execution,
Bruno Hauptmann found himself defending his very life in the "trial of the
century."2 A ransom note left on the windowsill of Baby Lindbergh's
room and another note that followed the kidnapping sparked huge controversy over the author of the notes.3 Among the evidence centering the
prosecution's case, lay the testimony of the handwriting expert, Albert S.
Osborn, who asserted that Bruno Richard Hauptmann wrote the notes as
part of his kidnapping scheme. 4 A handwriting expert for the defense testified and contended that Mr. Hauptmann did not write the ransom notes. 5
Whether Bruno Richard Hauptmann wrote the ransom notes remains a
controversy today.6
Some authors and advocates argue that our legal system victimized
Bruno Hauptmann because of the admission of questionable evidence:
expert handwriting testimony.7 This controversy extends far beyond this
infamous case, reaching the academic and judicial forum.8 Critics of
1 Laurence M. Nolan & Peter M. Tiersma, Hearing Voices: Speaker Identification in
Court,54 HASTINGS L.J. 373 (2003).
2 See Anthony R. Tempesta, The Lindbergh Case, 147 Mil. L. Rev. 293 (Winter
1995).

3 See Tempesta supra note 2, at 293.
4 Id. See David L. Faigman et al., SCIENCE IN THE LAW FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES,
115, 119 (West Group 2002) (discussing State v. Hauptman where Osborn testified as the
expert witness for the prosecution).
5 See State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).
6 See Tempesta, supra note 2, at 296 (discussing some of the attacks on
Hauptmann's conviction.); D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/KumhoImplications of
Observer Effects In Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2002) (commenting on Osborn's initial doubts as to the whether
Hauptmann wrote ransom notes); Laurie L. Levenson, Cases of the Century, 33 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 585, 612 n.20 (2000) (commenting on Mrs. Hauptmann's continued fight for her
husband's innocence).
7 Id. See also infra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining defendant's assertions that jury charge was prejudicial).
8 See infra note 78 and accompanying text (listing United State Appeals Court decisions that admit expert handwriting testimony); infra note 81 and accompanying text (list-
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handwriting expertise, mainly argue against the field's reliability and
credibility as a science. 9
Furthermore, contention between the United States Courts of Appeals and the Federal District Courts evinces inconsistent application of the
governing standards for the admission of scientific evidence. 0 With some
of the lower federal courts questioning the reliability of expert handwriting
testimony, and, therefore, its appropriate admissibility as expert testimony,
some of these district courts bar the evidence completely. 1
Other districts courts approach the issue of expert handwriting testimony admissibility by separating the testimony into two categories, limiting the expert testimony by denying testimony on authorship. 12 Specifically, these district courts that express concerns over the reliability of any
form expert handwriting testimony, are primarily troubled by the lack of
evidence supporting the field's validity outside its own community. 13
This note will focus on the failure of the United States Court of Appeals to adhere to the admissibility standards set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. After detailing the criticisms of expert handwriting testimony in both the academic legal field and the judicial forum, this note advocates for a strict adherence to the Supreme Court standards, which ultimately would bar all forms of expert handwriting testimony until the scientific reliability of this field is adequately established. Additionally, this
note addresses the compromised approach of some districts courts as an
alternative to a complete bar of expert handwriting testimony.
Specifically, Part II chronicles the early history of handwriting identification expertise, from its early origins in the French legal system
through its development in Anglo-American jurisprudence.' 4 This section
also explores the admission of expert handwriting evidence under previous
standards and the application of the current test as promulgated by the Su-

ing district courts that bar expert handwriting testimony); infra note 93 and accompanying

text (citing critics of handwriting expertise as a reliable science).
9 See infra note 93 and accompanying text (detailing criticisms of expert handwriting
evidence).

1o See infra notes 78 and 81 and accompanying text (comparing federal district courts
and federal appeal courts approach to expert handwriting testimony).
1 See infra note 82 and accompanying text (listing federal district courts that bar
expert handwriting testimony).
12 United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (separating expert
testimony into two categories and barring testimony regarding authorship); United States v.
Santillan, No. CR-96-40169DLJ, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (allowing testimony

only as to similarities and differences between known exemplar and questioned document).
13 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (highlighting districts courts' skepticism
as to the validity of handwriting expertise).
14 See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (detailing history of handwriting

testimony in foreign and American court systems).
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preme Court.15 Part III reviews the current state of the law in the federal
courts, highlighting the contention over the reliability of expert handwriting testimony between the United States Court of Appeals and the United
State District Courts. 16 Additionally, Part III analyzes the current test by
specifically tracing the inconsistencies of its application throughout the
circuits of the United States Court of Appeals.' 7 These inconsistencies
sparked additional criticism from those who oppose admitting expert

handwriting testimony."

Finally, Part IV advocates for a strict adherence

to the current Supreme Court test, contending that expert handwriting evidence on authorship should not fall under the purview of the Federal Rules
of Evidence as expert testimony. Rather, this type of evidence should be
considered lay testimony until the establishment of the field's reliability.' 9
II. HISTORY OF EXPERT HANDWRITING TESTIMONY
A. Early Legal Roots of the FirstForensicEvidence
Just as all men do not have the same speech sounds; neither
20
do they have the same handwriting.

Forgery detection dates back centuries to the reign of the great
Greek and Roman philosophers. 2z
15

As far back as Aristotle, scholars have

See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (chronicling evolving standards of

admitting scientific evidence from Frye's general acceptance test to enactment of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702); see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (explaining resolution
of conflict between Frye's general acceptance test and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in
Daubert).
16 See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (highlighting concerns over reliability
of expert handwriting evidence and forensic document examination as scientific or technical field).
17 See infra note 78 and accompanying text (evidencing circuit court's inconsistent
application of Daubert factors).
18 See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (criticizing failure of courts to adhere
to Daubert).
19 See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text (advocating for stricter adherence
to Daubert, requiring handwriting experts to establish reliability). See also infra notes 123124, 128 and accompanying text (explaining need to balance benefits of expert handwriting
testimony with concerns of field's reliability).
20 HARTFORD HUNTINGTON, YOU ARE WHAT YOU WRITE: COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS 43 (1973). This book explains graphology, the notion that one's
personality or identity can be deduced from one's handwriting. id. This note does not
address graphology and only focuses on handwriting experts who compare known and
unknown documents to identify the author.
21 E.g., J. NEWTON BAKER, LAW OF DISPUTED AND FORGED DOCUMENTS 3-12 (Michie

Co. 1955) (delineating history of handwriting analysis and forgery detection as far back as
Roman era), Faigman, supra note 4, at 115 (recognizing long history of handwriting expertise), Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert
World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251, 256 (1997) (commenting on centuries old practice of for-
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maintained that an individual's unique handwriting could lead to his or her
identification.22 The earliest systems of handwriting analysis date back to
seventeenth century France and Italy. 23 By 1737, France incorporated a
system of forgery detection into the law through the enactment of the Code
de Faux (translated as the Code Concerning Forgeries).24 Such a formality,
however, did not exist in the Anglo-American courts until a century later,
when English barristers successfully persuaded the courts to accept the
credibility of handwriting expertise. 25 Moreover, handwriting identification expertise became the first type
of "forensic expertise" 26 permitted in
27
the Anglo-American courtroom.
Most American jurisdictions followed the old English practice of
barring expert handwriting testimony until the enactment of the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854.28 In 1836, Massachusetts became the first
jurisdiction to recognize and admit the testimony of a handwriting expert
30
in Moody v. Rowell, 29 however, not without doubts as to its reliability.
As an interesting caveat, the Supreme Judicial Court in Moody reasoned
gery detection), D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV.
731, 734 (1988-89) (citing Huntington Hartford's Aristotle quote).
22 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 115 (explaining idea that a person's unique handwriting could lead to his identification as a very old concept).
23 Id. (indicating that these early European systems focused more on characteristics
of author, known today as graphology).
24 Id. According to Faigman, the Code de Faux regulated the collection of
exemplars
and the manner in which they were presented to the "experts." Id.
25 Id. at 116 (citing Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, construed to allow use of
handwriting expertise in English courts). Prior to this, authorship had been authenticated
through the use of lay witnesses who were familiar with the putative author's handwriting.
Id. at 117.
26 Handwriting experts are also known as "forensic document examiners." For the
purposes of consistency in terminology in this note, the term handwriting expert will be
used.
27 See United States v. Rutland, 372 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting expert handwriting testimony's historical use in American jurisprudence); United States v. Mooney, 315
F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002) (acknowledging long history of acceptance of evidence from handwriting expertise in courtrooms). See also Faigman, supra note 21, at 116 (identifying
Anglo-American handwriting expertise as "oldest 'forensic science"' despite lagging behind French by a century); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Constructionof Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV.
1723, 1747 (2001) (chronicling handwriting evidence doctrines and early experts).
28 See Faigman, supra note 21, at 117 (noting that American practice excluded expert
handwriting testimony until English construed statute otherwise).
29 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 490 (1835).
30 Id. (allowing use of expert handwriting testimony); see also Faigman, supra note 4,
at 117 (chronicling complex rise of handwriting expertise in the United States). With the
exception of Massachusetts, most American jurisdictions followed the English practice of
barring such evidence. Id. After the passage of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854,
an English statute, American courts began to admit handwriting expertise into evidence. Id.
at 116.
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that admitting such evidence would not be any more harmful than the previous methods employed to determine authorship of questioned documents.3 These previous methods included using lay witnesses who were
familiar with the alleged author's handwriting to authenticate the handwriting in the questioned document. 32 Today, the use of lay testimony is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 701.3
Eventually, many American jurisdictions followed Massachusetts
and started to admit expert handwriting testimony, yet based on the same
tenuous explanation articulated in Moody.34 This set the stage for the controversy surrounding the "science" of handwriting analysis as a reliable
tool and its appropriate place in American jurisprudence. 35 Given that the
only explanation for the admission of expert handwriting testimony rested
on the notion that it was better than using lay witnesses, critics contend that
this justification has no place in the courtroom because there is no proof of
such an assertion.36
The Court of Appeals of New York in Hoag v. Wright3 7 summarized the very crux of the dispute surrounding the admission of handwrit-

ing expertise by questioning the reliability of the expert's technique.38
Acknowledging the dubious value of handwriting expertise, the court explained that "in so many cases where such evidence is received witnesses
of equal honesty, intelligence and experience reach conclusions not only
31 Moody, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) at 498 (affirming the admission of the opinions of the
writing master as competent evidence). See generally Faigman et al., supra note 4 at 115
(detailing origins of handwriting evidence and forgery detection and its development into
area of expertise in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
32 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 117 (adding that in particular situations jury was
permitted to directly compare challenged documents with known exemplars).
33 FED. R. EvID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses: "If the witness is not
testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702." See also MASS. GEN. LAWS. 191, § 1 (2004) (allowing use of
lay witness to authenticate testator's signature).
34 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 117 (asserting this rationale remained dominant
explanation for use of handwriting experts in courtroom).
35 Compare Faigman, supra note 4 at 115 (criticizing field of handwriting analysis),
D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New "Post-Daubert World"-A Reply to Professor
Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 406-18 (1998) (labeling field of questioned document examination as "not science"), and Risinger et al., supra note 21, at 772 (arguing that
no case has "ever examined, much less determined, whether these 'experts' can do what
they claim") with Moenssens, supra note 21, at 251(defending the field of handwriting
expertise).
36 See Risinger et al., supra note 21, at 772 (censuring admission of evidence with no
proven reliability, that results in denial of rational trial to opponent).
" 66 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1903).
38 See Faigman, supra note 41, at 117 (declaring Hoag as typical of prevailing attitude at that time regarding handwriting expertise).
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39
diametrically opposite, but always in favor of the party who called them.
After Hoag, some courts continued to reject handwriting expertise while
others that admitted this evidence remained skeptical.4n
Eventually, expert handwriting testimony gained widespread acceptance in courtrooms, and demands for handwriting experts increased.4'
During the early part of the twentieth century, handwriting analysis manuals emerged,
training others in this field while continuing to battle skepti42

cism.

Handwriting expertise gained great momentum into the field of
"'science" after the publication of QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, a collaboration between Albert S. Osborn, known for his expert testimony in the Lindbergh Baby Kidnapping case and John Henry Wigmore, known for his
treatise on evidence.4 3 Heralded as the quintessential book on handwriting
analysis, Osborn and Wigmore effectively launched the field of handwriting expertise out of the realm of "quack science" for the time being. 44 The
infamous "Lindbergh baby kidnapping" case, State v. Hauptmann,45 evidenced Osborn's culminating triumph in the field.46
In Hauptmann, Osborn, an expert witness for the prosecution, testified that Bruno Richard Hauptmann wrote the ransom notes found in connection with the kidnapping of Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr.47 Subsequently, a
jury convicted Hauptmann of kidnapping and murder, arguably due to the
testimony of the handwriting expert as asserted by the defense.48 Pro39 Hoag, 66 N.E. at 581 (classifying opinions of handwriting experts "as of uncertain
value").
40 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 117. Despite the skepticism, experts started to gain
greater respect, growing into a larger community. Id.
41 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 118 (highlighting some literature on handwriting
analysis published in the 1890's). Faigman cited to The Manual of the Study of Documents
by Persifor Frazer, Disputed Handwriting by William E. Hagan and Ames on Forgery by
Daniel T. Ames. Id.
42 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (listing some popular literature and training manuals on handwriting analysis and forgery detection).
43 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 118 (identifying Questioned Documents as point
where expert handwriting analysts gained credibility).
44 Id. at 119 (criticizing current literature on subject of handwriting analysis as merely
"rearrangements or expansions of Osborn's 1910 book").
41 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).

46 See Faigman, supra note 4, at 119 (discussing State v. Hauptman where Osborn
testified as the expert witness for the prosecution).
47 See Hauptmann, 180 A. at 822-23 (explaining defendant's contention that jury
charge was unduly prejudicial due to specific references to Mr. Osborn's testimony). The
jury charge specifically recounted Osbom's testimony and conclusion that the evidence was
"irresistible, unanswerable and overwhelming." Id. at 821. The jury charge simply remarked that the expert for the defense rebuts the testimony of the expert for the prosecution.
Id.
48 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (detailing defendant's objections to
evidence); see also Risinger et al., supra note 21, at 771 (describing public need for closure
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claimed as an expert in the field of handwriting identification and forgery
detection after the Hauptman case, Osborn increased acceptance for the
field, while temporarily eradicating some of the skepticism aforementioned
in Hoag.49

B. Admitting HandwritingEvidence: Gatekeepers Beware
As previously discussed, testimony from handwriting experts has a
long history in the courtroom, receiving widespread acceptance in both the
federal and state court systems. 50 For many years, courts admitted testimony from both lay witnesses and "experts" to identify authors of questioned documents.51 In Frye v. United States,5 2 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia stated that expert opinion based on scientific
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as
reliable in the "relevant" scientific community. 53 With regards to handwriting expertise, the particular technique employed by the handwriting
54
expert need only be accepted within the field of handwriting analysis.
The Frye "general acceptance" standard remained the test for admitting forensic or scientific evidence until the enactment of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, which conflicted with the Frye test. 55 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows a qualified witness to testify if it will assist the trier of
and belief that Hauptmann was guilty); Faigman, supra note 4, at 119 (characterizing public's need to believe that Hauptmann was guilty).
49 See In re State of Sylvestri, 55 A.D. 2d 916, 918 (App. Div. 1977) (declaring that
expert handwriting analysts have achieved respectable standing in the courtroom). See
Faigman, supra note 4, at 119 (claiming that in years following Hauptmann, no reported
opinion barred expert handwriting testimony). See also Moody, 315 F.3d at 62 (listing
factors that trial judge used to determine admissibility of handwriting expert's testimony
including persuasiveness of historical acceptance); Crisp, 324 F.3d at 265 (observing on
court's long recognition of handwriting analysis as sound method for making reliable identifications).
50 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (chronicling the eradication of
court
skepticism after Osborn's testimony in Hauptmann).
51 See United States v. Brown Okolo, 82 F. App'x. 131, 137 (5th Cir. 2003) (admitting lay testimony on handwriting under Fed. Rule of Evidence 701); see supra note 32 and
accompanying text (detailing use of lay witnesses for authentication of unknown document).
52 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) overruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
53 Id. at 1014 (reasoning that methodologies employed by experts "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs").
54 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining the parameters of "general
acceptance").
55 See infra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining conflict with Frye test and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702). The Supreme Court eventually dealt with the inconsistency
in Daubert. Daubert,509 U.S. 579. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining
court's reasoning in Daubert).
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fact.56 The key language in the rule "assist the trier of fact" and "qualified
as an expert" suggests the need for further exploration into the reliability of
particular testimony before admitting scientific evidence based solely on
"general acceptance. 57
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 58 the United
States Supreme Court finally addressed the conflict surrounding the appropriate standard for admitting scientific evidence. 59 The plaintiffs, individuals born with serious birth defects and their parents who took Bendectin
during their pregnancies, filed a lawsuit against Dow Pharmaceuticals asserting that the drug caused their defects. 60 The defendants, manufacturers
of the drug Bendectin, marketed the prescription drug as a means to reduce
morning sickness in pregnant women. 61 The plaintiffs brought forth eight
expert witnesses with various credentials, each of whom concluded that
Bendectin could cause birth defects.62
The district court granted the defendants petition for summary judgment, reasoning that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle
upon which it is based is "sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs. 6 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that under Frye expert knowledge must be premised on generally accepted methodologies in the particular field to which it belongs. 64 Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme
Court concluded that the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 did not
56 FED. R. EvID. 702. Testimony by Experts: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
57 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (clarifying that displacement of Frye test by Fed.
Rule of Evidence 702 did not remove any "limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence"). The court stressed that the rules require not only established relevancy but
reliability. Id.
58 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
59 Id. at 587-89 (squaring "Frye" test with enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence
702).
60 Id.
6' Id. at 582.

62 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583. The experts based their conclusions on "in vitro" and
"in vivo" animal studies that discovered a link between Bendectin and malformations. Id.
These studies supported the theory that similar malformations could be found in humans.
Id. Specifically, pharmacological studies of Bendectin's chemical structure evidenced
similarities with other drugs that caused birth defects. Id.
63 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
rev'd, 509 U.S. at 579 (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978))
(reasoning that because opinion of petitioner's expert did not rely on enormous body of
epidemiological data regarding Bendectin, it conflicted with Frye).
64 Daubert,951 F.2d at 1130. The court stated that "expert opinion based on a methodology that diverges significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities
in the field cannot be shown to be "generally accepted" as a reliable technique." Id. (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985).
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establish "general acceptance" as the absolute prerequisite to admissibility. 65 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the defendant did not present
any clear evidence that the drafters of the rule intended to incorporate the
"general acceptance" standard into the rule, which would essentially codify
Frye.66
Rather, the Court in Daubert set forth the following four-prong test
for assessing the relevancy and reliability of expert handwriting testimony:
1) whether the particular scientific theory can be and has been tested, 2)
whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, 3)
what the known or potential rate of error is, and 4) whether the technique
has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.67
The Court cautioned, however, that other factors may be used to assess
whether certain scientific evidence is reliable. 68 The new standard opened
the door to more controversy over expert testimony as inconsistent application of the Daubert factors emerged in subsequent federal court cases regarding the admissibility of such testimony.69
Additionally, the Daubert opinion created some confusion over its
application to the "technical or otherwise specialized knowledge" segment
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because the Court in Daubert limited its
discussion to the scientific context7. Specifically, with respect to evidence
from handwriting experts, some courts argued that handwriting analysis is
actually a "technical" field rather than "scientific," thus falling outside the
purview of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.71 In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael,72 the Unites States Supreme Court resolved this issue, holding
that the trial court's gate keeping function extended to expertise in technical evidence.73 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed the importance of the
65

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (reasoning that Fed. Rule of Evidence 702 assigns "to the

trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation
and is relevant to the task at hand").
66 Id. at 588 (stating that drafting history does not mention Frye). The Court notes
that adhering to the rigid "general acceptance" standards "would be at odds with the liberal

thrust of the Federal rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
opinion testimony." Id. (internal quotes omitted).
67 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (stressing that the inquiry is flexible).
68 Id. at 595 (noting that the focus "must be solely on principles and methodology, not
on the conclusions that they generate").
69

See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (evidencing inconsistent application

and contention between circuit and district courts over admissibility of expert handwriting
testimony).

70 See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that issue before the court is whether Daubert applies to technical or other special-

ized knowledge testimony).
71

cal).

See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1041 (holding handwriting expertise as techni-

72 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
73 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999) (concluding

that it would prove difficult to administer different evidentiary standards based on distinc-
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gatekeeping function, stressing that the purpose of the rule is to assure reliability and relevancy of expert testimony.74 Furthermore, the Court clarified that "[i]t is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the court-

room the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field. 7 5 Thus, based on Kumho Tire, it is clear
that courts should apply the Daubert factors to both scientific and technical
fields when determining admissibility of expert evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.76 Therefore, handwriting analysis falls clearly
within the purview of Daubert, regardless of its status as technical or scientific.7 7

III. THE CURRENT LAW
Most United States Court of Appeals have considered the issue of
the admissibility of expert handwriting testimony and all, with one exception, hold that it is admissible under the Daubert standard. 78 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the one exception, affirmed
the lower federal district court's approach of separating the expert testimony into two categories, allowing the expert to testify only on the simition between "scientific" knowledge versus "technical or otherwise specialized" knowledge).
74 Id. at 152.
75 id.
76 Id. at 141 (concluding that trial court may consider one or more of Daubert's
factors to determine reliability of scientific or technical testimony). The court also emphasized
that the list posted in Daubert was not exhaustive. Id.
77 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141 (concluding that gatekeeping function of Daubert
applies to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge).
78 Compare United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (affirming
lower court's admission of expert handwriting testimony), United States v. Rutland, 372
F.3d 543, 545-46 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting notion that revealing expert's credentials would
influence jury to accept expert's opinion rather than underlying analysis), United States v.
Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2003) (illuminating long history of acceptance of
expert handwriting testimony in courtroom as assurance of reliability required by Daubert),
United States v. Sanders, 59 F. App'x. 765, 767 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding district court's
admission of handwriting examiner's testimony as proper), United States v. Kehoe, 310
F.3d 579, 593 (8th Cir. 2002) (labeling expert's testimony as reliable and helpful to jury),
United States v. Prime, 363 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) vacated by 125 S.Ct. 1005
(2005) and opinion amended by 431 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that district
court carefully applied Daubert factors), United States v. Jolivet, 224 F.3d 902, 906 (8th
Cir. 2000) (reasoning that expert's testimony enhanced jury's understanding of evidence
before them), United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906, 911 (11th Cir. 1999) (admitting expert
handwriting testimony), United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding handwriting testimony about defendant's signature admissible), United States v.
Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing expert handwriting analysis as
a field of expertise) with United States v. Hernandez, 42 F. App'x. 173, 176 (10th Cir.
2002) (affirming lower court's decision to bar expert testimony on authorship).
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larities and differences between the known exemplar (known document or
sample) and the questioned document, but barring testimony on authorship.7 9
The major contention over the admissibility of expert handwriting
testimony rests between the United States Court of Appeals and the federal
district courts.80 Primarily, some federal district courts are very reluctant
to accept handwriting expertise as reliable scientific or technical evidence. 8' Some of these federal districts courts completely bar expert
handwriting testimony for failing to satisfy the Daubert factors.82 In
United States v. Saelee,83 the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska considered testimony from handwriting experts to be unreliable.84
Additionally, the court determined that handwriting expertise potentially
misleads the trier(s) of fact because of the "expert" status of the witness
and his or her long list of "credentials."8 5
In United States v. Hines,86 decided prior to the Hernandez case, the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts discussed at
length its concerns regarding the possible prejudicial effect of an "expert"
testifying as to his or her opinion on authorship.87 The court reasoned that
79 See Hernandez, 42 F. App'x. at 176-77 (affirming lower court's decision to sepa-

rate expert testimony into two categories, allowing testimony on similarities and differences).
80 See Deputy v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 345 F.3d 494, 509 (7th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging diverging opinions between circuit and district courts without officially weighing in
on issue of admissibility).
81 See United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) criticized
by United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (barring expert testimony for failure
to pass muster under Daubert); United States v. Brewer, No. 01CR892, 2002 WL 596365,
at *8 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (doubting whether expert handwriting analysis could proffer any new
evidence of its reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102-03 (D.
Alaska 2001) (determining that handwriting expert lacked reliability under Daubert analysis). The court stressed the lack of peer review by an unbiased community of practitioners
in addition to narrowing in on the lack of statistics for potential error rate, ultimately concluding that the methodology was unreliable. Id. at 1102-05.
82 See Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d at, 554 (holding expert handwriting testimony inadmissible for failure to satisfy Daubert test); Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 at 1102-03 (holding
expert handwriting testimony inadmissible based on failure to establish reliability).
83 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001).
84 Id. at 1102 (finding that theories and methodologies could be tested but concluding
that overall there was a lack of testing sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702
admission).
85 Id. at 1105 (characterizing government's witness as testifying with apparent authority on a subject of seemingly specialized knowledge whose validity court is unable to
likely to
evaluate). The court further cautioned that the government's expert witness "'is
mislead the jury as to assist it in determining the facts of this case. Id.
86 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
87 Id. at 68 (reasoning that handwriting expertise has not been sufficiently tested to
ensure reliability); see also Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (declaring that minimal testing
done in the field of handwriting analysis raises grave concerns about reliability of methods
employed).
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such an issue lies within the competence of the average juror and ultimately should be left to the jury without the influence of the expert's credentials. 88 The court recognized the value of the expert's testimony as to
similarities and differences between the questioned document and known
exemplar, allowing such testimony as a means to assist the jury with making the final decision and as a time saving measure. 89 The court reasoned
that such a compromise would effectively balance the interests of both
parties. 9°

The risk of unduly prejudicing the jury with expert testimony always exists, especially when the field is so complex that the concepts are
beyond the competence of the trier(s) of fact. 91 In particular, the concern
with expert testimony in handwriting is that the field of handwriting analysis lacks any evidence that an "expert" is more competent than a lay person
to compare handwriting samples, and furthermore, that the field is so complex that it requires the services of an expert.92 Generally, critics attack the
entire field of handwriting expertise and not just a particular methodology. 93 Serious questions remain as to whether testimony on authorship can
94
truly pass muster under Daubert.

88

See Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (reasoning that opinion on authorship would ex-

ceed expertise).
89 Id. at 69 (concluding that "experts" can be used in absence of lay witnesses to
compare handwriting). The court noted that "experts" have studied handwriting for years
and are essentially "observational experts." Id.
90 See supra note 88-89 (explaining concerns with expert testimony's reliability and
how a compromise could serve interests of justice).
91 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (discussing power of expert evidence and its potentially misleading results).
92 See Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03 (discussing Kam studies on handwriting
abilities between lay persons and experts). The court in Saelee noted that lay persons and
experts possessed similar skills in detecting forgeries. Id. at 1102. Specifically, experts
distinguished authentic signatures somewhat better than lay witnesses; lay witness incorrectly found forgeries to be authentic signatures and vice versa slightly more than experts.
Id. The court considered this evidence inconclusive of the field's reliability. Id.
93 See generally Faigman et al., supra note 4 at 115 (chronicling judicial response to
handwriting expertise and summarizing statistical data on handwriting expert's proficiency); Risinger et al., supra note 21, at 772 (advocating for complete exclusion of expert
handwriting testimony); Risinger et al., supra note 34, at 406-18 (defending criticisms of
previous article and labeling field of questioned document examination as "not science").
In Daubert,the respondents argued that the specific methodology lacked credibility within
the field. Daubert,509 U.S. at 582.
94 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (expressing concerns over the lack of
testing in this field). In Saelee, the court conveyed reservations about the field's lack of
controlling standards and the lack of peer review by practitioners outside "the closed universe of forensic document examiners." Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1104-05.
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IV. CLEARING THE SLATE
The majority of the United States Court of Appeals has concluded
that handwriting expertise is reliable, however, the basis for this conclusion
rests on the notion that the field has enjoyed a long history of acceptance in
the courtroom.95 Moreover, the application of the Daubert standard to

expert handwriting testimony remains inconsistent among the federal circuits, leaving case law in conflict.9 6 Specifically, the reliability of such
expertise and the status of handwriting expertise as "scientific" or "technical" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 are seriously

questioned. 97 The lengthy history of admitting expert handwriting testimony suggests that the majority of courts approach the question of admissibility under the antiquated Frye "general acceptance" standard, while
using Daubertterminology.9 8 It appears to be simply a question of judicial
tradition: expertise in handwriting identification and forgery detection is
reliable because the techniques have been accepted and tested in the court
system over time. 99 The dissenting opinion in Leroy v. Crisp,'° ° criticized
the majority's excusal of handwriting expertise from any comprehensive
Daubert analysis simply "because these techniques are generally accepted
95 See
testimony).
quated Frye
96 See

Paul, 175 F.3d at 910 n.2 (stating that courts have accepted expert handwriting
See infra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing current use of the antigeneral acceptance test).
infra note 98 and accompanying text (highlighting circuit courts that admit

expert handwriting testimony without discussing Daubert factors).
97 See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp at 1029, 1047 (holding forensic document examination expertise as nonscientific within meaning of Fed. Rule of Evidence 702 and outside
scope of Daubert analysis). This case, decided before Kumho Tire, resolved the issue of
whether "technical or other specialized knowledge" came under the purview of Daubert,
did explain in dicta, that if handwriting expertise were subjected to Daubert analysis, it
would have to be excluded. Id at 1036. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing
academic critics of forensic document examination as "science"); Crisp, 324 F.3d at 280
(Michael, J.,dissenting) (asserting that lack of critical review has stunted advancement of
methodology).
98 See Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (clarifying that evidence previously accepted
in past by courts does not translate into automatic acceptance under Daubert and Kumho
Tire); Crisp, 324 F.3d at 272 (Michael, J.,dissenting) (discussing historical acceptance of
expert handwriting testimony but highlighting recent criticisms of reliability). But see
Rutland, 372 F.3d at 545-46 (admitting expert handwriting testimony without any discussion of satisfying Daubert factors); Prime, 363 F.3d at 1033-35 (admitting expert handwriting testimony based on a Daubert analysis with a discussion of each prong); Crisp, 324
F.3d at 270-71 (admitting expert handwriting testimony after listing Daubert factors but
without any analysis); Brown Okolo, 82 F. App'x. at 137 (admitting lay testimony on
handwriting under Fed. Rule of Evidence 701); Mooney, 315 F.3d at 61-62 (admitting expert handwriting testimony without any discussion of satisfying Daubert factors); Kehoe,
310 F.3d at 593 (admitting expert handwriting testimony based on Daubert but without any
discussion of Daubert factors).
99 See Crisp, 324 F.3d at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting) (stating majority's belief leads
to excusing handwriting analysis from careful scrutiny under Daubert).
100 324 F.3d 261.
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and have been examined for nearly one hundred years in our adversarial
system of litigation."'' ° The dissent cautions that reliance on judicial tradi02
tions is not sufficient to establish reliability under Daubert.1
Moreover,
many criticize this judicial tradition, contesting that the techniques have
not been truly tested 10in3 the court system much less scientifically proven as
required by Daubert.
A less confusing approach may reconcile the inconsistent applications of Daubert by separating the analysis from opinion on authorship
from testimony on similarities and differences between the known exemplar and questioned document. °4 By recognizing two distinct categories of
expert handwriting testimony, courts can balance the need for such expertise to assist the trier(s) of fact with the need to insulate the trier(s) of fact
from potentially prejudicial "expertise" on authorship that fails a strict
0 5 Courts, however, should strictly adhere to
scrutiny under the Daubert.1
Daubert when analyzing both categories of testimony, ultimately barring
any expert testimony for unproven reliability.106
A. Only the Experts Can See the Writing on the Wall

Every circuit that considered the issue of expert handwriting testimony admitted some form of expert testimony. 107 Yet, very few decisions
offer any explanation, much less analysis, of how expert handwriting testimony comports with the more careful scrutiny set forth in Daubert. °8
10'

Id. at 272.

102

See infra note 112 (explaining that courtroom is no substitute for scientific testing);

see also McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11 th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[riulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert's methodology").
103 See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp at 1038 (highlighting that more recent
texts and
training material in field of handwriting expertise still cite to publications from 1910 and
1929). The court concluded that "despite the existence of a certification program, professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert be regarded as scientific.. .knowledge." Id. See also Risinger et al., supra note 4, at 772 (claiming that no case
has ever examined reliability of handwriting experts as to ability to detect authorship).
104 See Hernandez, 42 Fed. App'x. at 173 (affirming the trial court's decision to bar
expert testimony on authorship). See infra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing
other courts that have severed testimony into two categories, allowing only expert testimony on similarities and differences).
105 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (outlining potential benefits of some
form of expert handwriting testimony).
106 See Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (explaining that purpose of Daubert and Fed.
Rule of Evidence 702 is to exclude unreliable scientific expert testimony).
107 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (evidencing various circuits that have
held handwriting expertise admissible).
108 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing current use of the antiquated
Frye general acceptance test and listing court that admit expert handwriting testimony without any Daubert analysis).
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Critics that question the reliability of handwriting expertise, claim that the
field's validity has only been assumed since Wigmore's treatises.1°9 Furthermore, critics contend that the techniques employed in expert handwriting testimony remain undeveloped since the first handbook.110
Additionally, Daubert does not suggest that acceptance by the legal
rather than the scientific community suffices for reliability. 1 The courtroom is not the place to test scientific theory.' 1 2 Cross examination of a
handwriting expert does not equate to subjecting the field to the rigorous
standards of the scientific community as required by Daubert 13 The purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as postulated by the Supreme Court
in Daubert, cautions courts against admitting scientific evidence without
any scrutiny.' 1 4 Trial judges, functioning as gatekeepers, must maintain

security and balance; they should not permit passage through the gates
simply because an expert asserts his techniques are reliable." 15
Moreover, the mere historical acceptance of handwriting expertise
in the legal forum does not translate into a free pass under Daubertbecause
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 replaced the "general acceptance" test of
Frye.116 Nothing in the Daubert opinion proposes that scientific evidence
admissible under Frye "is grandfathered in or is free of the more exacting
analysis now required."' 17 Under Daubert, general acceptance is only one
prong of the analysis, yet many courts have continued to admit expert
handwriting testimony solely on this basis, clearly following the obsolete
rule of Frye."8
109 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing lack of improvements in

methodology in the field of handwriting expertise).
110 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing references to methodologies
dating back to 1910).
...Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273 (Michael, J., dissenting) (cautioning that our adversarial
system is not a substitute for Daubert analysis).
112 Id. (conceding that adversarial testing is important but as only a tool of the legal
system and cannot be substituted for empirical testing of reliability).
113 Id. (underscoring that many criminal defendants are indigent and do not have independent access to rebuttal expert).
114See Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (affirming importance of court's gate keeping
function).
115 See Crisp 324 F.3d at 273 (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that expert handwriting evidence passed through courts with little judicial scrutiny). Judge Michael comments
that it appears as though the only practitioners that have assessed the field's validity are
other handwriting experts. Id at 279.
116 Id. at 272 (agreeing with contention in Saelee that only new scientific evidence fell
under the purview of Daubert).
117Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273 (Michael, J., dissenting) (contending that previous exposure
to the adversarial process does not relieve previously accepted evidence of the "more exacting analysis now required"); see Saelee, 162 F. Supp.2d at 1105 (concluding that expert
testimony that has been previously accepted does not equate to a general acceptance after
Daubertand Kumho).
118 Crisp, 324 F.3d at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for accepting
techniques because they had been accepted for over one hundred years); supra note 78 and
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Furthermore, critics from both the judicial and academic forums
contend that no meaningful evidence of reliable testing exists to prove the
validity of handwriting analysis. 119 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York observed in United States v. Starzecpyzel, that a half century after Wigmore's and other texts, the field of
handwriting expertise failed to advance any improved methods of comparing handwriting samples for identification. 120 Those who weighed in are
only other handwriting experts, suggesting that the field has not endured
any peer review from a "competitive, unbiased community of practitioners
and academics.' 12' Additionally, critics question what incentives remain to
advance the field handwriting analysis examination
if courts do not force
22
the experts to defend their methodologies.
B. Let Us All See the Writing on the Wall

Some federal district courts divide the expert testimony into two
main categories: (1) similarities and differences between the known exemplar and the questioned document and (2) opinion as to authorship of the
questioned document.123 In Hines, the court expressed concerns about the
accompanying text (evidencing various circuits that admit expert handwriting testimony
without any discussion of Daubert).
119 See Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (holding expert handwriting testimony inadmissible for failure to establish reliability); Hines, 55 F. Supp.2d at 68 (concluding that
handwriting expertise has never been "subject to meaningful reliability or validity testing");
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1034 (noting lack of evidence to support that everyone's
handwriting is unique); see also Risinger et al., supra note 21, at 772 (asserting that tests do
not support the claim that handwriting analysts are "experts").
120 Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1038 (positing that one would expect improvements
in the methodology and techniques since the early treatises). Defendants attributed the lack
of improvement in the field of handwriting analysis to the fact that the "discipline has no
counterpart in industry or academics with an economic incentive to study and refine its
scientific basis." Id.
121 Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1038 (suggesting that "a logical choice for
a relevant
scientific community would seem to be a collection of such mainstream sciences as pattern
recognition and motor control); Crisp, 324 F.3d at 280 (Michael, J., dissenting) (asserting
that lack of critical review has stunted advancement of methodology); see Saelee, 162 F.
Supp. 2d at 1104 (declaring that minimal empirical testing raises grave concerns regarding
reliability of methods currently used).
122 See United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp.2d 548, 554 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) (observing
that proficiency tests ineffectively assess proficiency if everyone passes); see also D. Michael Risinger et al., Science and Non-science in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting
Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REv. 21, 42 (1996) (contending that "expertise" exists
only if there is a significant accuracy advantage over average jurors).
123 See Hines, 55 F. Supp.2d at 68 (admitting expert handwriting testimony only on
similarities and differences between disputed document and known exemplar). See also
Wolf v. Ramsey, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1347-48 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (reasoning that expert
handwriting testimony may assist trier of fact by testifying as to similarities and differences
but barring testimony on authorship); United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968
(D. Ari. 2002) (barring testimony on authorship); United States v. Van Wyc, 83 F. Supp. 2d
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reliability of expert testimony from handwriting analysts, because "it has
never been shown to be more reliable than the results obtained by lay people." 24 The court, however, also recognized the usefulness of such testimony, choosing to balance these concerns without barring the evidence
completely. 2 Remedying these concerns, the court labeled an expert's
testimony about the similarities and differences between two documents as
observational and potentially helpful in the conservation of time. 126 More
specifically, a lay person could make the same observations in the courtroom as an expert but it would take more time. 127 Therefore, allowing an
"expert" to make these observations outside of the courtroom and then
present them to the jury in a concise manner seemed sensible. 28
In contrast, expert testimony as to authorship presents a more troubling issue of reliability because of the lack of evidence to support any
consistent methodology, rate of error or outside peer review, as discussed
above. 29 Moreover, the proposition that handwriting uniqueness is testable within Daubert's meaning, does not translate into the conclusion that
of the uniqueness princiit has actually been tested. 30 Finally, acceptance
3
ple within the field does not satisfy Daubert.11
515, 523 (D.N.J. 2000) (barring expert testimony as to authorship of unknown writing);
United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp.2d 1190, 1193-94 (D. Neb. 2000) (holding handwriting analyst not entitled to offer opinions on the ultimate issue of authorship); United
States v. Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (barring expert handwriting
testimony on authorship).
124 Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d at 68-69 (recognizing government's expert, Kam
and his
studies as interesting and important but not without severe criticism). Judge Gertner further
commented that such studies cannot purport to have established the reliability of the field to
any "meaningful degree." Id. at 69.
125 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (commenting on potential benefits of
testimony from handwriting experts).
126 Hines, 55 F.Supp. 2d at 68 (reasoning that without any lay witnesses, government
must use testimony from "experts" those who study handwriting).
127 See Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d at 69 (comparing lay witness's conclusions due to time
and exposure to that of an expert, labeling latter as "observational experts, taxonomistarguably qualified because they have seen so many examples over so long").
128 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining observations between lay
and expert witnesses). See also Van Wyc, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (concluding that testimony
on similarities and differences can be helpful to jury); Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1190
(concluding that limits should be placed on expert handwriting testimony by barring opinions on authorship); Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765, at *4 (finding it helpful to separate the
proffered expert handwriting testimony into two categories).
129 See supra notes 82-85, 119, 122 and accompanying text (commenting on the overall skepticism about handwriting's testability).
130 See Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (holding that nothing supports the proposition
that uniqueness of handwriting can be proven). The court acknowledged that while the
Kam studies support the notion that expert handwriting analysts are better than lay persons
in excluding false positives, it does not support the uniqueness principle upon which authorship testimony is based. Id.
131 See Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-05 (stressing lack of peer review by unbiased
community of practitioners fails to support proposition of reliability); Rutherford, 104 F.
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C. A Strict Adherence to DaubertNo Matter What Wall You Look At
Every court must strictly adhere to the Daubert standard. 132 The notion that handwriting expertise passed muster under Frye, cannot continue
33
under Daubert.1
Though general acceptance is one prong of the Daubert
analysis, the court must balance the other factors. 34 Moreover, it is essential to distinguish between acceptance within the courtroom and acceptance
within the scientific or technical community, the former of which is not
sufficient under Daubert135 As gatekeepers, courts must force handwriting
experts to defend and prove
their methodologies; otherwise, they must not
1 36
be given expert status.
On the other hand, courts who admit this testimony may be reluctant to bar the evidence entirely and as a result a compromise may be in

order.137 Recognizing two categories of expert handwriting testimony may
relieve skepticism and offer critics an opportunity to use its potential benefits to assist the trier(s) of fact in an efficient manner.138 Though some
district courts have barred expert handwriting testimony completely, a
Supp. 2d at 1193 (maintaining that there was "no blind external proficiency testing involved
which could demonstrate any scientific reliability").
132 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (highlighting circuits that admit expert
handwriting testimony based on long history of acceptance and reliability).
"33 See Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273 (Michael, J., dissenting) (contending that previous
exposure to the adversarial process does not relieve previously accepted evidence of the
"more exacting analysis now required"); Saelee, 162 F. Supp.2d at 1105 (concluding that
expert testimony that has been previously accepted does not equate to a general acceptance
after Daubert and Kumho). See also supra note 57 and accompanying text (resolving conflict between FRE 702 and general acceptance test).
134 See Saelee 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (listing five factors that courts should balance
when determining admissibility of scientific testimony).
135 See Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp.2d at 967 (holding that the principle of uniqueness fails
to satisfy the Daubert/Kumho test).
136 See Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (barring expert handwriting testimony for failure
to pass muster under Daubert); Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03 (concluding that handwriting expert lacked reliability under Daubert analysis). See also Brewer, No. 01CR892,
2002 WL 596365, at *7 (doubting whether expert handwriting analysis could proffer any
new evidence of its reliability). The court conceded that expert handwriting testimony has
often been permitted by courts in the past, however, the government failed to proffer evidence to prove the reliability of the handwriting comparison testimony). Id. See Crisp, 324
F.3d at 273 (Michael, J., dissenting) (contending that previous exposure to the adversarial
process does not relieve previously accepted evidence of the "more exacting analysis now
required"); Saelee, 162 F. Supp.2d at 1105 (concluding that expert testimony that has been
previously accepted does not equate to a general acceptance after Daubert and Kumho).
See also supra note 119 and accompanying text (highlighting lack of advancement in the
field of forensic document examination).
137 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing courts that admit expert
handwriting testimony on similarities and differences between known and questioned exemplars).
138 Supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining potential benefits of expert
handwriting testimony).
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logical argument can be made that testimony as to similarities and differences can be helpful to the trier of fact in both conserving time and high39
lighting key points in the compared documents.
As to testimony on authorship, there is no conclusive support for its
reliability and thus fails under a strict Daubert analysis. 40 Failure to apply
a strict Daubert analysis poses serious risks that the trier of fact will rely
too heavily on the "credentials"
and opinion of an expert from a field that
41
reliability.
scientific
lacks
V. CONCLUSION
A strict adherence to the Daubert analysis must be applied consistently. There is a potential compromise, however, that acknowledges the
difficulties in establishing reliability in a field that has not been tested outside of its own realm, while recognizing that the field has something to
contribute to the legal process. The basic tenet of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "to assist the trier of fact," welcomes helpful and relevant expertise. Helpful, however, does not suggest that experts do not have to
prove the reliability of their testimony. Testimony only as to the similarities and differences between a questioned document and a known exemplar
can assist the judge or jury to determine the issue of authorship while removing potentially prejudicial effects. Arguably, barring testimony on
authorship achieves a necessary balance between using helpful information
to analyze evidence and preventing prejudicial and harmful effects. Courts
may no longer rely on historical acceptance alone in deciding whether to
admit scientific expert opinion testimony but must balance the factors set
139 Compare Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (holding expert handwriting testimony
inadmissible for failure to satisfy Daubert test), and Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03
(holding expert handwriting testimony inadmissible based on failure to establish reliability)
with Ramsey, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1347-48 (reasoning that expert handwriting testimony may
assist trier of fact by testifying as to similarities and differences but barring testimony on
authorship), Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (barring testimony on authorship), Van Wyc,
83 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (barring expert testimony as to authorship of unknown writing), Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1193-94 (holding handwriting analyst not entitled to offer opinions on the ultimate issue of authorship), Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (admitting expert
handwriting testimony only on similarities and differences between disputed document and
known exemplar), Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765, at *4 (barring expert handwriting testimony on authorship).
140 See Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (holding that nothing supports the proposition
that uniqueness of handwriting can be proven). The court acknowledged that whiles the
Kam studies support the notion that handwriting experts are better than lay persons in excluding false positives, it does not support the uniqueness principle upon which authorship
testimony is based. Id.
141 See Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273 (underscoring that many criminal defendants are indigent and do not have independent access to rebuttal expert). See also Risinger et al., supra
note 21 at 772 (censuring admission of evidence with no proven reliability because it results
in denial of rational trial to opponent).
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forth in Daubert. We must always question the reliability of any piece of
evidence and always understand the process by which it is obtained.
Simone Ling Francini

